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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a novel approach to multi-agent coor-
dination in general sum Markov games. Contrary to what
is common in multi-agent learning, our approach does not
focus on reaching a particular equilibrium between agent
policies. Instead, it learns a basis set of special joint agent
policies, over which it can randomize to build different solu-
tions.
The main idea is to tackle a Markov game by decomposing
it into a set of multi-agent common interest problems; each
reflecting one agent’s preferences in the system. With only
a minimum of coordination, simple reinforcement learning
agents using Parameterised Learning Automata are able to
solve this set of common interest problems in parallel. As
a result, a team of simple learning agents becomes able to
switch play between desired joint policies rather than mixing
individual policies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent
systems
General Terms
Algorithms
Keywords
agent coordination, learning agents, Markov games, rein-
forcement learning
1. INTRODUCTION
A large part of the multi-agent learning literature focuses
on finding a Nash equilibrium between agents’ policies [5].
However, while a Nash equilibrium represents a local opti-
mum, it does not necessarily represent a desirable solution
for the problem at hand. This is clearly demonstrated by
the famous prisoner’s dilemma game, where the unique Nash
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equilibrium does not represent a desirable outcome, since
both agents can simultaneously do better.
In this paper we are interested in agents learning realis-
tic patterns of behavior. One such pattern, which occurs
naturally in human interactions is turn taking. When faced
with conflicting interests, humans can often compromise by
agreeing to take turns to select each participant’s desired re-
sult. This compromise frequently leads to outcomes that are
more desirable than those reached by a population of agents
selfishly optimizing their individual rewards. In [3] the prob-
lem of learning to take turns is studied in repeated games.
The goal of this paper is to show how simple reinforcement
learning agents are able to learn interesting patterns of play,
like turn taking, in general sum Markov Games.
We present a new multi-agent coordination approach for
learning patterns of desirable joint agent policies. To do
so, we depart from the idea of jointly learning an equilib-
rium in the full Markov game. Instead, our main idea is to
tackle a Markov game by decomposing it into a set of multi-
agent common interest problems called Multi-agent Markov
Decision Processes (MMDPs); each reflecting one agent’s
preferences in the system. Reinforcement learning agents
using Parameterised Learning Automata [2] (PLA) are able
to solve this set of MMDPs in parallel. As a result, a team of
simple learning agents can switch play between these desired
joint policies. A trusted third party is used to communicate
simple coordination signals to regulate the switches. In case
all agents can fully trust their opponent players, this third
party is even unnecessary.
2. MARKOV GAME DECOMPOSITION
The main idea behind our algorithm is to split the Markov
game into a number of common interest problems, one for
each agent. These problems are then solved in parallel, al-
lowing agents to switch between different joint policies, in or-
der to satisfy different agents’ preferences. The agents learn
the preferred outcome for each participant in the game. We
develop a system in which agents alternate between opti-
mising different agent goals in order to satisfy all agents in
the system. This implies that we let agents switch between
playing different joint policies.
To implement this mechanism, a single recurrent state
in the system is select as the switch state. Play is then
divided in episodes, with a single episode comprising the
time-steps between 2 subsequent visits to the switch state.
Each episode a different objective to be optimised can be
selected, with the different objectives here corresponding to
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Figure 1: Markov game decomposition
the reward function of different agents.
Thus agents do not only learn their own policy, they also
learn the preferences of the other agents. To do this, agents
associate multiple learning automata (LA) with each state,
one for each agent in the system. One automaton is used
to learn their own policy, while the others are used to learn
the preferences of the other agents. When they start a new
episode, focussing on the next agent’s goal, they use and up-
date the automata corresponding to that goal in each state
until the episode ends. At the end of the episode the agents
all receive the reward corresponding to agent of the past
episode.
This system effectively transforms the Markov game into
a set of MMDPs. Each MMDP represents the problem of
finding the joint policy that maximises the reward for a sin-
gle agent in the system. By switching between different
automata to learn different agents’ preferences, the agents
are actually solving each of the MMDPs in an interleaved
manner, using the algorithm described in the previous sec-
tion. Using the PLA update system, the agents will find the
optimal joint policy in each MMDP, which corresponds to
the joint policy maximizing the reward for the corresponding
agent. Thus when the automata have converged, the agents
continuously alternate between the stationary joint policies
that are optimal for the different agents in the system.
By implementing a coordination mechanism, agents also
correlate their policy choices. This means that agents are
not limited to the product distributions, given by individ-
ually mixing policies. Instead, agents using this system to
coordinate their policy switches, can play only desired joint
policies, rather than the entire cross product of their indi-
vidual policy sets. This allows them to only reach desirable
outcomes of the game, in this case the joint policies that
maximise the reward for one of the participating agents.
3. COMBINING JOINT POLICIES
Using the switching mechanism described above we can
learn the joint policies that maximise each agent’s individual
payoff. One additional requirement to implement this sys-
tem is a mechanism to decide which MMDP will be played
next. This mechanism determines how the different joint
policies learnt in the set of MMDPs are combined into a sin-
gle solution and consequently how much each agent’s goal is
optimised.
In our setting we implement this switching mechanism us-
ing a separate dispatcher agent. This agent is separate from
the other agents and does not participate in the actual learn-
ing problem. Instead this agent coordinates all other agents
and determines the reward to optimise next. In this way the
actual learning agents do not need information on the ac-
tions and rewards of others or even the fact that other agents
are present in the system. Whenever the system reaches the
switch state, the current episode ends and the dispatcher be-
comes active. The dispatcher then collects the total rewards
up to the current time step for each agent and sends each
agent in the system 2 pieces of information: a feedback for
the last episode and the index for the next problem to be
played. The learning agents themselves do not need to know
whose reward they are optimising, they can simply use the
index to select the corresponding automata during the next
episode.
Currently, we focus on an egalitarian selection mechanism.
This means we try to maximise the minimum of the players’
rewards and the dispatcher will always choose to optimize
the payoff of the worst performing agent, i.e. the agent with
the lowest average reward over time for the entire running
time. In this way we can resolve dilemma’s resulting from
agents having different preferences for the game outcomes,
by letting them take turns to play their optimum outcome.
This allows each agent to achieve their desired objective at
least some of the time and assures that no agent will always
be stuck with its minimum payoff. In [4] we demonstrate
these results on a set of motivational examples.
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper we introduced a multi-agent learning algo-
rithm which allows agents to switch between stationary poli-
cies in order to equalize the reward division among the agent
population. In the present system we rely on a dispatcher
agent to select the objective to play and the correlate agents’
policy switches. If we assume that all agents are coopera-
tive and willing to sacrifice some payoff in order to equalize
the rewards in the population, this functionality could also
be embedded in the agents, either by letting agents com-
municate or allowing each agent to observe all rewards . In
systems where agents cannot be trusted or are not willing
to cooperate, methods from computational mechanism de-
sign could be used to ensure that agenst’ selfish interests
are aligned with the global system utility. Another possible
approach is considered in [1], where the other agents can
choose to punish uncooperative agents.
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